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G HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SECTION

This annex contains information on response to hazardous material (HAZMAT) spills or releases. This information is included so that all local policy for pollution response can be found in a single publication.

Information in this annex includes:

* HAZMAT risk analysis

* HAZMAT incident response guidelines

* HAZMAT response cleanup plan evaluation

G-I HAZMAT RISK ANALYSIS

Knowns and unknowns - it is acknowledged that the Coast Guard is by no means the expert when dealing with hazardous materials (HAZMAT). Similarly, the expertise among commercial industry, while highly specific, is also limited. For this reason, every attempt must be made to ensure that this annex is updated on a regular basis with regard to contractor information, particularly in terms of cleanup capabilities.

For the purpose of HAZMAT risk analysis, the task is simplified by an examination of MSO Jacksonville's AOR by regions and the risks that exist in each region. The boundaries for MSO Jacksonville Hazardous Material release response is the same as for the Coast Guard predesignated Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) area for oil spills. The area in which COTP Jacksonville is the predesignated FOSC for oil spills and Hazardous Material releases is defined by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Coast Guard and the EPA. As a result of the MOU and as delineated therein, the COTP Jacksonville is the predesignated FOSC for the coastal areas and the EPA is responsible for the inland areas.

This Contingency Plan applies only in the area where the COTP is the predesignated FOSC.

As defined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. EPA (Region IV) and the Seventh U.S. Coast Guard District, the Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Office, Jacksonville, Florida will be the predesignated FOSC in the following areas. When a roadway is used to delineate a boundary, that boundary shall be to, but shall not include, the roadway.

Coastal areas from $30^{o}50'$ N. latitude on the east coast of Georgia southward to 28^{o} N. latitude on the east coast of Florida. Latitude $30^{o}50'$ N. on the east coast of Georgia due west to I-95; thence southerly to US 17 Interchange, Becker, Florida; thence southerly along US 17 to Trout River

Drive, Jacksonville (Panama Park), Florida; thence southwesterly to State Highway 115 (FL 115); thence easterly along FL 115 to Buffalo Avenue; thence southerly over the John Mathews Bridge to University Blvd; thence northerly to Ft. Caroline Road; thence easterly to FL 101A; thence southerly to the intersection with the St. Johns County line; thence south and west along the St. Johns County line to US 1; thence southerly to I-95, Marineland interchange; thence southerly to US 1, Ormond By The Sea interchange; Thence southerly to the intersection of MSO Jacksonville-MSO Miami Boundary at 28^{o} N. latitude (near Malibar).

Also included is the St. Johns River, including waterfront facilities, inland to the FL 17 Bridge, Palatka, Florida.

MSO Jacksonville's AOR can be broken down into distinct regions: St. Mary's/Fernandina; St. Johns River/Jacksonville from the mouth of the river to Palatka; Atlantic ICW from the St. Johns River to the Indian River Lagoon and on to Malibar, FL; and the Port Canaveral area.

These responses will NOT typically involve USCG personnel on-scene, unless the magnitude of the event is such that special forces such as the Strike Team are required. The main focus of the response will be in the ICS/UCS roles, and coordination with other Federal, State, and Local emergency response organizations.

ST. MARYS RIVER/FERNANDINA

Threats - facilities/installations: In this region, there are several waterfront facilities, located on Amelia Island. These include several paper mills, which handle a variety of chemicals in the processing and manufacture of paper and paper pulp products. Also, the Navy submarine base at Kings Bay, GA, handles a variety of HAZMAT, from chemicals to nuclear materials.

Threats - road/rail/ship transport: Some HAZMAT is brought into the port of Fernandina via ship in small amounts. At the time that this Annex was drafted, no specfics were available on detailed quantities or type, but the amounts are believed to typically be less than 500 gallons at a time. While numerous roads traverse the area, two primary bridges are of concern with respect to the St. Marys River. The first is Interstate I-95, and the second is the CSX railroad bridge. While both bridges cross the St. Marys River in EPA region IV's AOR, the potential exists for spilled HAZMAT to travel downstream and into MSO Jacksonville's AOR. CSX will soon be able to provide detailed information on amount and type of HAZMAT traversing the railroad bridge across the St. Marys river. However, FL DoT has no information regarding the type or amount of HAZMAT crossing the I-95 bridge, although it is suspected to be high in quantity and quite variable in type.

Most likely case scenarios discharge - because of the unknowns, a multiple listing of possibilities is included here. This approach should help with regard to planning and exercises; planners should vary the focus to each type of possibility, so that when an incident does occur, the details of different situations have been examined.

1. HAZMAT incident at the Navy Base - Of particular interest is the acid used in batteries for the submarines at the base. The amount would be small, typically less than 500 gallons. In fact, spills have occurred in the past. Fortunately, the base has

its own specially trained HAZMAT response team with an Incident Command Structure. MSO Jacksonville as FOSC would typically not be directly involved with responding in this scenario.

2. Truck accident on I-95 bridge - This incident would involve liquid or gas HAZMAT. The amount would be relatively small, typically limited to the capacity of the truck involved. Less likely would be the involvement of more than one truck, but the quantity would still be limited to the contents of the vehicles involved. The response would be limited to coordination with EPA, and the limiting/prevention of the spread of HAZMAT, downstream and/or into environmentally sensitive areas. River currents and tides, as well as prevailing winds, would have a direct impact upon the time factor in this scenario.

3. Facility spill in Fernandina - This incident would involve liquid or gas HAZMAT. The amount would vary widely, but would not typically be over 1000 gallons. Although the HAZMAT used by the facilities is typically transported via land, the facilities are in very close proximity to the water. The response would vary with the amount, and would depend upon the quantity and type of HAZMAT. Close coordination with the RP, and activation of the ICS/UCS are possibilities in this event. River currents and tides in the area would play a major role. The potential for danger to humans exists also, and should be considered when planning for this particular scenario.

Worst case scenario discharge - due to the limited amount of large quantities of HAZMAT (in excess of 1000 gallons) that are handled in this region, only a couple of scenarios are presented. It is important to research and plan for these incidents when setting up exercises, so that as much reality can be introduced to identify major obstacles that must be handled. Of paramount concern is the containment of the spill and the hazards posed to humans and the environment.

1. Nuclear accident at the Navy Base - Although unlikely, the possibility of a radiological accident exists at the Navy base in conjunction with either the weapons or propulsion systems aboard the submarines there. Amounts of material and the scope of the event are varied. While the Navy is uniquely well-equipped to respond to such incidents, the MSO as FOSC may be required to set up a UCS to respond, depending upon the magnitude of the incident.

2. Train derailment across the St. Marys River - Although somewhat unlikely, the possibility exists for a train derailment across the St. Marys River. As was the case under the most likely case scenario discharge, prevailing tides and winds will play a major factor in how rapidly the HAZMAT spreads downstream and into the AOR of MSO Jacksonville. Containment will be of paramount importance, and close coordination with EPA Region IV officials and their efforts will be vital.

ST. JOHNS RIVER/JACKSONVILLE

Threats - facilities/installations: In this region, there are several waterfront facilities located throughout Jacksonville and down into the Green Cove Springs area. These include shipyards and onload/offload terminals, which handle quite a variety of chemicals in the processing and manufacture of all types of products. Additionally, the Navy has two bases: Naval Station Mayport at the mouth of the St. Johns River, and Naval Air Station Jacksonville, south of the downtown area along the St. Johns River. Both military bases handle a variety of HAZMAT.

Threats - road/rail/ship transport: Some HAZMAT is brought into the port of Jacksonville, to Blount Island and Talleyrand terminals, via ship. Data provided by the Port Authority shows fertilizers, sulfuric acid, and sodium hydroxide as the largest quantities, all at or below 35 tons per year (most recent figures for 1994. This data is rough guidance, and may not include all HAZMAT shipped by all users of JPA facilities.) While numerous roads transverse the area, two primary bridges are of concern with respect to the St. Johns River. The first is the Interstate I-95 Fuller-Warren and I-295 Buckman bridges, and the second is the CSX railroad bridge across the St. Johns River in downtown Jacksonville. All three bridges cross the St. Johns River in MSO Jacksonville's AOR. CSX will soon be able to provide detailed information on amount and type of HAZMAT traversing the railroad bridge across the St. Johns river. However, FL DoT has no information regarding the type or amount of chemicals crossing the I-95 and I-295 bridges, although DOT estimates that many such shipments cross the river, and the type of material is quite variable.

Most likely case scenarios discharge - because of the unknowns, a multiple listing of possibilities is included here. This approach should help with regard to planning and exercises; planners should vary their focus to cover each type of possibility, so that when an incident does occur, the details of different situations have been examined.

1. HAZMAT incident at either Navy Base - This type of incident has occurred in the past, although the amounts have been small, typically less than 100 gallons. Fortunately, both bases have their own specially trained HAZMAT response teams with an Incident Command Structures. In these cases, COMNAVBASEJAX is the initial Navy On-Scene Commander (NOSC). MSO Jacksonville as FOSC would typically not be directly involved with responding in this scenario.

2. Truck accident on the I-95 or I-295 bridge - This incident would involve liquid or gas HAZMAT. The amount would be relatively small, typically limited to the capacity of the truck involved. Less likely would be the involvement of more than one truck, but the quantity would still be limited to the contents of the vehicles involved. The response would be significant, primarily because of the difficulty in locating an RP if the time factor is short and the driver of the truck is injured/unable to provide information about the shipment. After first responders have arrived on-scene, a UCS that involves the LEPC is critical, especially if there is a threat to life or property. River currents and tides, as well as prevailing winds, would have a direct impact upon the time factor in this scenario. Consideration should be given to closing the affected region to vessel traffic.

3. Facility/shipyard spill along the St. Johns River - This incident would involve liquid or gas HAZMAT, or caustic soda, the most common HAZMAT transported on the river. The amount would vary widely, but would not typically be over 1000 gallons. Although the HAZMAT used by the facilities/shipyards is typically transported via land, the facilities are in very close proximity to the water. The response would vary with the amount, and would depend upon the quantity and type of HAZMAT. Close coordination with the RP, and activation of the ICS are possibilities in this event. River currents and tides in the area would play a major role. The potential for danger to humans exists also, and should be considered when planning for this particular incident. Thus, again LEPC's should be involved with the response.

Worst case scenario discharge - due to the limited amount of large quantities of HAZMAT (in excess of 1000 gallons) that are handled in this subregion, only two scenarios are presented.

1. Train derailment across the St. Johns River - Although somewhat unlikely, the possibility exists for a train derailment across the St. Johns River. Due to the length of the bridge, such an incident might involve a large amount of HAZMAT, possibly as much as 10,000 gallons or more. As was the case under the most likely scenario, prevailing tides and winds will play a major factor in how rapidly the HAZMAT spreads downstream and into the AOR of MSO Jacksonville. CSX Intermodal controls all rail movement of HAZMAT across the St. Johns River, and they would be the first contact that should be established. CSX also has an ICS/UCS type structure that is implemented in such cases. MSO Jacksonville as FOSC would be coordinating with CSX to form a joint UCS to handle the incident. Containment will be of paramount importance, and again close coordination with LEPC due to the close proximity to large populations will be vital as well.

2. Vessel collision/grounding in the St. Johns River - This scenario is more likely, but due to the smaller quantity of HAZMAT, it presents a smaller risk. The waterway can be difficult to transit, particularly during restricted visibility. Although no HAZMAT releases have occurred due to vessel groundings/collisions, the quantity per incident could be substantial. As was the case under the most likely scenario, prevailing tides and winds will play a major factor in how rapidly the HAZMAT spreads . MSO Jacksonville as FOSC would be setting up a UCS structure soon after the incident occurred. Containment will be of paramount importance, and again close coordination with LEPC due to the close proximity to large populations will be vital as well. Salvage efforts could require considerable expertise. Use of special forces such as the Strike Team should be given early consideration.

ATLANTIC ICW FROM THE ST. JOHNS RIVER TO THE INDIAN RIVER LAGOON TO MALIBAR, FL

Threats - facilities/installations: In this region, there are several waterfront installations. These are primarily work areas/shipyards (such as Bollinger Shipyard), and marinas. The quantity of HAZMAT is relatively small in this region along the banks of the ICW.

Threats - road/rail/ship transport: Some HAZMAT is transported along the ICW, albeit in limited quantities by the smaller commercial vessels that transit this waterway. At the time that this Annex was drafted, no specifics were available on detailed quantities or type, but the amounts are believed to typically be varied by type and less than 100 gallons. While numerous roads transverse the area, the bridges that cross the ICW that are available for truck traffic are of primary concern. There are more than 20 such bridges, and all are within the jurisdiction of MSO Jacksonville as FOSC. As discussed in previous sections, FL DoT has no information regarding the type or amount of chemicals crossing these bridges, although it is suspected as quite variable but low in quantity. The bridges are not used as thruways, but rather routes to reach voyage termination points. Since industrial work along the ICW is not significant, the traffic is therefore light.

Most likely case scenario discharge - because of the unknowns, a single listing is included here, which covers a broad category of possibilities..

1. Installation/workyard spill along the ICW - In this scenario, the type and amount of HAZMAT will be varied, but would not be substantial in quantity (most likely less than 100 gallons). Potential threat to human life would depend upon the installation's proximity to a population center such as Daytona or St. Augustine. Due to the extensive tidal marshes and environmentally sensitive areas along the ICW, the threat to wildlife would be relatively high. Close, early coordination with the RP and responders/cleanup crews is vital to ensure minimal environmental damage.

Worst case scenario discharge - due to the limited amount of large quantities of HAZMAT (in excess of 1000 gallons) that are handled in this region, only one scenario is presented. Of paramount concern is the containment of the spill and the hazards posed to humans and the environment.

1. Truck incident on a bridge crossing the ICW - This incident would involve liquid or gas HAZMAT. The amount would be relatively small, typically limited to the capacity of the truck involved. Less likely would be the involvement of more than one truck, but the quantity would still be limited to the contents of the vehicles involved. The response would be significant, primarily because of the difficulty in locating an RP if the time factor is short and the driver of the truck is injured/unable to provide information about the shipment. After first responders have arrived on-scene, a UCS that involves the LEPC is critical, especially if there is a threat to life or property. Consideration should be given to closing the affected region to vessel traffic.

PORT CANAVERAL/CAPE CANAVERAL AREA

Threats - facilities/installations: In this region, there are several waterfront installations. The quantity of HAZMAT is relatively small in this region on the banks of the ICW. The major handlers of HAZMAT in the area are the Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, and Patrick Air Force Base.

Threats - road/rail/ship transport: Some HAZMAT is transported along the ICW, albeit in small quantities by the smaller vessels that transit this waterway. Canaveral port authority figures show no substantial HAZMAT as being specifically imported to or exported from the port. Therefore, transiting, smaller commercial vessels are believed to typically move less than 100 gallons. No bridges cross the port itself.

Most likely case scenarios discharge - because of the small size of the port itself, a single listing of possibilities is included here. This approach should help with regard to planning and exercises; planners should vary focus on each type of possibility, so that when an incident does occur, the details of different situations have been examined.

1. Installation/workyard spill in the port or nearby facility - In this scenario, the type and amount of HAZMAT will be varied, but would not be substantial in quantity (most likely less than 100 gallons). Potential threat to human life would depend upon the type of chemical, since there is a substantial population center nearby. Due to the large concentration of marine life in the area, the threat to the environment would be relatively high. Close, early coordination with the RP and responders/cleanup crews is vital to ensure minimal environmental damage. For the Space Center and Air Force facilities, specialized HAZMAT teams exist to conduct response and cleanup operations.

Worst case scenario discharge - due to the limited amount of HAZMAT in the port, the worst case scenario discharge is seen as identical to the most likely case scenario discharge. A factor to consider is the large volume of cruise ship passengers that transit the area. Any response to a large incident would need to take into account the people that may be on a cruise ship that has just arrived or is preparing to depart.

1. Truck incident on a bridge crossing the ICW - This incident would most likely involve a liquid or gas HAZMAT spill. The amount would be relatively small, typically limited to the capacity of the truck involved. Less likely would be the involvement of more than one truck, but the quantity would still be limited to the contents of the vehicles involved. The response would be significant, primarily because of the difficulty in locating an RP if the time factor is short and the driver of the truck is injured/unable to provide information about the shipment. After first responders have arrived on-scene, a UCS that involves the LEPC is critical, especially if there is a threat to life or property. Consideration should be given to closing the affected region to vessel traffic.

OFFSHORE

Threats - ship transport: The knowledge regarding HAZMAT transport specifics offshore is little, but the potential for type and quantity is unlimited. As shown by the TMI-11 barge incident in early 1996, large quantities of HAZMAT do routinely move through MSO Jacksonville's AOR while enroute to other ports.

Most likely case scenario discharge - the most likely incident is one involving a relatively small amount of HAZMAT (less than 500 gallons).

1. HAZMAT barrels lost from vessel during transit in heavy weather - This scenario is not infrequent during severe tropical weather systems and winter nor'easters that have occurred in the past several years. The procedure for dealing with drums is the same, regardless of where they are located. As approved under the July 1995 MOA by the state of Florida and the U.S. Coast Guard, drums found in or near the water which contain Hazardous Material or unknown materials must be handled as HAZMAT until determined to be otherwise. In accordance with an agreement between the U.S. Coast Guard Seventh District and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection the following guidance applies: The retrieval, testing, and disposal of drums containing hazardous materials or suspected of containing hazardous materials, found floating on the waters within the FOSC zone will be the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard. The retrieval, testing, and disposal of drums containing hazardous materials or suspected of containing hazardous materials, found intact on the beach, or on the banks of waters located within the FOSC zone, will be the responsibility of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection. Drums containing hazardous materials or suspected of containing hazardous materials found to be leaking product onto the beach, or on the banks of waters located within the FOSC zone, will be the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Worst case scenario discharge - the worst case scenario involves the release of a large quantity of HAZMAT, with the possible sinking of the vessel involved. Because of the variables of such an incident, the details are quite different for each incident.

1. HAZMAT incident offshore and possible sinking of a vessel - this incident, although not usually representing an immediate danger to human life or the inland marine environment, presents possibly the worst case scenario of all cases in this risk analysis section because of the large quantities involved; up to a million gallons or more. Close coordination with the RP for recovery efforts is essential. As was shown by the TMI-11 barge case in early 1996, every effort to work with the RP for cleanup and recovery must be made. Close coordination and communication are essential. While it is impossible to cover all of the variables of such an event when planning, a "lessons learned" study of case histories is extremely valuable in determining potential obstacles beforehand.

G-II HAZMAT INCIDENT RESPONSE

ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES:

MSO Jacksonville - MSO Jacksonville is not specially trained or equipped to respond to a hazardous material release. MSO Jacksonville maintains a level D response capability with basic training in the management of hazardous material releases. In addition the MSO has an extensive library of chemical reference materials and has access to the Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO) and Aerial Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) computer software programs. These programs can help the pollution investigators identify the pollutant and inform them of the hazardous associated with that particular material and the necessary safety equipment needed for the response. The ALOHA program produces an aerial map of an airborne chemical release and can help identify those areas which should be avoided or evacuated.

Local HAZMAT Teams - The City of Jacksonville Fire Department has the only certified HAZMAT response team in the northern half of MSO Jacksonville's response zone. The city has a mutual assistance agreement with all of the surrounding counties and has even responded to a HAZMAT incident in Camden County Georgia. The southern half of MSO Jacksonville's zone is serviced by the Brevard County HAZMAT response team which has a similar mutual assistance agreement with its surrounding counties. These HAZMAT response teams have Level A, B, and C HAZMAT response entry capabilities and are trained to contain and mitigate any foreseeable hazardous material release in the AOR.

USCG Strike Teams - If the release is too large for the local resources to handle effectively, the FOSC may call the NSF Gulf Strike Team for assistance. The Gulf Strike Teams capabilities include:

* Responding with trained personnel and specialized equipment to prevent, contain and/or remove releases of hazardous materials

* Identifying, locating, and assisting in the transportation of specialized equipment needed for response

* Supervising/monitoring response personnel on sites

* Outlining, establishing, monitoring site safety requirements during hazardous material spill/release operations

* Providing resource and photographic documentation support

* Providing command, control, and communications support

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

MSO Jacksonville's AOR has numerous HAZMAT response organizations. For most minor HAZMAT incidents for which the MSO will be responsible, those without identifiable responsible parties or responsible parties not taking timely action to mitigate the release, the MSO will contract a cleanup contractor with an established Coast Guard basic ordering agreement (BOA). When a release occurs which requires more services than a BOA contractor can supply, or when a BOA contractor is not available, contractors without a BOA may be utilized.

CONTRACTORS WITH COAST GUARD BOAs

RESPONSE CAPABILITY

ENVIRONMENTAL RECOVERY GROUP A
251 Levy Road
Atlantic Beach, FL
(904) 241-2200

FLORIDA SPILL RESPONSE CORPORATION A
605 Townsend Road
Cocoa, FL
(407) 631-7778

CAPE CANAVERAL MARINE SERVICES A
8051 Astronaut Blvd.
Cape Canaveral, FL
(407) 868-0670

CONTRACTORS WITHOUT COAST GUARD BOAs

ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION SERVICES INC. A
465 Tresca Road
Jacksonville, FL
(904) 721-7225

FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CORP. B
933 Lee Road Suite 406
Orlando, FL
(800) 771-1050

LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAZMAT TEAMS

DUVAL COUNTY

HAZMAT STATION #7.....(904) 630-0529

NAS CECIL FIELD .....(904) 778-5626

NAS JACKSONVILLE .....(904) 772-2717 Ext.121

NAVAL STATION MAYPORT .....(904) 270-6730

ALACHUA COUNTY & VICINITY

GAINESVILLE HAZMAT TEAM .....(904) 334-2401

ST.JOHNS COUNTY & VICINITY

ST. JOHNS COUNTY HAZMAT TEAM ...(904) 829-2226/823-2644

ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT

DISTRICT CHEMICAL SPILL TEAM ...(904) 329-4219/329-4358

VOLUSIA COUNTY & VICINITY

VOLUSIA COUNTY HAZMAT TEAM .....(904) 254-1500

ORANGE COUNTY & VICINITY

ORANGE COUNTY HAZMAT TEAM .....(407) 244-3544

ORLANDO HAZMAT TEAM .....(407) 246-2166

BREVARD COUNTY & VICINITY

BREVARD COUNTY HAZMAT TEAM .....(407) 635-7835

KSC HAZMAT RESPONSE .....(407) 867-3795

G-III PLAN EVALUATION

In order to determine shortfalls, obstacles, and omissions within any plan, routine exercises must be conducted which involve a number of different scenarios.

The National Response Team has developed guidelines for exercise programs. This guide is invaluable for planning and evaluating simulations, and should be consulted prior to beginning of HAZMAT exercise planning events.

It is important that the exercise be conducted in three, logical phases: Preparation, Conduct, and Post Exercise.

Preparation should include the following factors:

* Establish a design team, which consists of key players and stakeholders. The team is responsible for determining objectives and ensuring that the "play" is smooth during the exercise. Two key factors are needed for successful exercises, and they happen in the planning stages: emphasis on safety, and support from elected and appointed officials in the region.

* Decisions regarding the size of the exercise should be considered early, and must be appropriate to the needs and abilities of the participants.

* Selection of objectives should be done using some form of needs assessment to determine areas of unfamiliarity or shortfalls.

* A realistic scenario, with correct time sequences and real-world events and materials enhances the effectiveness of the exercise.

* Plans for evaluation BEFORE the drill starts are vital. If the evaluators know what they are looking for based upon the objectives, the feedback for the participants afterwards is much easier to perform.

Exercise conduct should start by the delivery of a descriptive narrative. Minimal interference by evaluators and observers should be emphasized, unless it appears that the players will not initiate a critical part of the drill without outside direction. The flow should be managed through sequential introduction of key pieces of information and the use of control messages.

Post-exercise activities should include the following items:

* The evaluation process should be base upon observed facts. A logical approach is to present the observations as they occurred, in a chronological sequence. Feedback should address whether objectives were met and if any shortfalls exist.

* Follow-up exercises or actions should be considered for future improvements. Concrete recommendations for improvement are invaluable to participants.

* Follow-up is often omitted. Long-term goals can be established following the event, and specific objectives to test improvements can be set for the next set of exercises.